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Livoti and Manning: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW
I.

COURT OF APPEALS RECOGNIZES ACTION FOR BREACH OF
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

In Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.' the South Carolina Court of
Appeals recognized a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract. Specifically, the court

held that if a plaintiff-former employee can show that some "contract" has
altered his employment-at-will status, then he may also state a cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 This
decision will have a substantial impact on employer liability in "employment
handbook" cases.
Julian Shelton was an employee at the Louis Rich processing plant in
Newberry. He received the company's 1979 employee handbook when he was
hired. The handbook contained guidelines and procedures that the company
claimed to follow in firing employees. Louis Rich amended the handbook in
1983 and inserted a disclaimer stating that the handbook did not form an
employment contract between the company and its employees.' Except for
inserting the disclaimer in the newly issued handbook, the company did not
inform its employees of the changes. In 1987, a Louis Rich security guard
reported that he had observed Shelton and a co-worker smoking marijuana in
the co-worker's van that was parked in the company lot. Relying on this
report, Louis Rich fired Shelton.5 Shelton sued, claiming that Louis Rich
failed to ensure enforcement of its rules and policies "'fairly and equally with
regard to all employees.'"6

1.

__

S.C.

459 S.E.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted, Davis Adv. Sheets No.

_,

2312 (Apr. 4, 1996).
2. Id. at

459 S.E.2d at 857.

_,

3. South Carolina first recognized this exception to the general employment-at-will rule in
Small v. SpringsIndustries, Inc., 292 S.C. 481,357 S.E.2d 453 (1987). Many employers provide
their employees with policy manuals or handbooks outlining company rules and procedures. The
typical "employee handbook" case arises when a fired employee sues - claiming the employer
did not follow its procedures in terminating the employee. Many courts, including the Springs
court, have concluded that it is unjust for an employer "to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other
similar material in mandatory terms" and then "ignore these very policies." Id. at 485, 357
S.E.2d at 455. In order to rectify this "gross inequality," the court held that a handbook can alter
the at-will employment status. Id. For further discussion of this doctrine, see Thomas R.
Haggard, Employee Handbooks-Still Evolving in South CarolinaLaw, 5 S.C. LAW. Sept./Oct.
1993, at 23.
__

5. Id. at
6. Id. at

,
,

S.C. at _,

4. Shelton,

459 S.E.2d at 853.

459 S.E.2d at 853.
459 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting the employee handbook).
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Shelton's suit raised several claims: breach of contract, breach of contract
accompanied by a fraudulent act, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 7 He also claimed that Louis Rich
was collaterally estopped from relitigating factual issues decided by the South
Carolina Employment Security Commission (ESC) during a contested
hearing. 3 The trial court granted Louis Rich's motion for a directed verdict
on the breach of contract claim and disposed of the remaining claims on
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. 9 Shelton appealed.
The court of appeals addressed Shelton's collateral estoppel argument
directly by announcing a clear rule as to the estoppel effect of ESC factfinding. 0 After considering the purpose of the unemployment compensation
statute," the court held that ESC findings would not estop relitigation in a
subsequent trial because such an estoppel would frustrate the primary purpose
of ESC proceedings-to provide benefits to an employee as quickly as
possible.' 2 Furthermore, the court decided that administrative hearings should
not have estoppel effect because the usually small stakes are less likely to
encourage full and fair litigation.' 3 The ruling leaves parties free to pursue
any claims and defenses in the circuit court and does not hamper the more
expedient administrative process.
The court of appeals then reversed the trial court's decision on the breach
of contract claim.' 4 The court relied on Small v. Springs Industries, Inc. 5
, 459 S.E.2d at 853.
7. Id. at
459 S.E.2d at 854.
8. Id. at,
, 459 S.E.2d at 853.
9. Id. at
10. Id. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 855.
11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-27-20 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (providing for the "compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through
no fault of their own").
S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 855. The court also relied on several cases from
12. Shelton,
other jurisdictions. Id. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 855 & n.2. Most explicitly, the court gave weight
to CaliforniaDepartmentofHuman ResourcesDevelopment v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1971),
in which the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of employment security hearings was to get
money to an employee as soon as possible. Shelton, , S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 854.
13. Shelton, _ S.C. at __, 459 S.E.2d 855. In its first footnote, the court distinguished

Bennett v. South CarolinaDepartment of Corrections,305 S.C. 310, 312-13, 408 S.E.2d 230,
231-32 (1991), in which the supreme court held that collateral estoppel does apply to facts
litigated before the State Employee Grievance Committee. TheShelton courtdistinguished Bennett
on a number of factors. First, the court noted that when attacking a discharge decision, state
employees are required to bring their claims before the grievance committee; however, state
employees go before the ESC only to determine unemployment benefits. Second, the grievance
committee hearings are more in the nature of a full evidentiary hearing, but ESC proceedings are
more in the nature ofa "summary proceeding." Shelton, _ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 854 n. 1.
Third, Bennett, the discharged employee, did not appeal the grievance committee's findings of
fact, and because he did not take the administrative process to its full conclusion, he was estopped
from relitigating identical factual issues in the circuit court.
14. Shelton, _ S.C. at __, 459 S.E.2d at 856.
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and its progeny to hold that the Louis Rich's 1979 handbook could have been
an employment contract and that the trial court should have submitted the issue
to the jury. 6 The court focused on the language of the 1979 handbook and
found that Louis Rich wrote it in mandatory terms.' 7 In the court's opinion,
this was "not a case where the employer ha[d] merely made general, gratuitous
assurances of fair dealing .... Rather, it [wa]s a case where the employer,

by inserting mandatory language in its employee handbook, ha[d] expressly
it [would] implement and adhere to the rules
guaranteed its employees that
8
outlined in the handbook."
The court then addressed an issue that the trial court did not reach
because of its dismissal of the breach of the contract claim: whether the
disclaimer in the 1983 amended handbook effectively modified the 1979
version and whether Shelton had notice of the change. 9 Relying on Fleming
v. Borden, Inc. ,2 the court declined to hold, as a matter of law, that Shelton
had "actual notice" of the disclaimer." Fleming permits an employer to alter
the employment relationship through a handbook modification so long as each
affected employee has "reasonable notice of the modification" which, in the
employment context, means "actual notice."' The court of appeals, noting
that there was "no evidence that [Shelton] read and understood the disclaimer," z remanded the case for a new trial on this issue.24
The court affirmed the trial court's decision on Shelton's two fraud
claims. Judge Goolsby, writing for the court, noted that there was "no

15. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
16. Shelton, _ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 855-56.
17. Id. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 856. The court quoted the following language: "'These rules
are a fair way to protect everyone and the company willfe]nsure that these rules will be enforced
fairly and equally with regard to all employees.'" Id. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 856.
459 S.E.2d at 856. The employer, in its petition for certiorari, argued that
18. Id. at _,
the language in the handbook is not mandatory and cited Mills v. Leath, 709 F. Supp. 671
(D.S.C. 1988), as support for this proposition. Petition for Writof Cert. of Petitioner/Respondent
at 6-7. In Mills, there was language similar to that involved in Shelton; however, the district court
held that it was not mandatory enough to create an employment contract and alter the employee's
at-will status. See Mills, 709 F. Supp. at 674.
19. Shelton, __ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 856-57. The disclaimer in the 1983 handbook
should also be recognized that the language used in this handbook is not intended to
read: "[I]t
create a contract of employment and that employment is terminable at the will of either the
employee or the employer." Id. at

_,

459 S.E.2d at 856.

20. 316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994).
21. Shelton, __ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 857.
22. Fleming, 316 S.C. at 463, 450 S.E.2d at 595-96.
23. Shelton, _ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 857. Louis Rich, in its Petition for Certiorari,
argued that the court of appeals misconstrued the holding of Fleming by requiring that an
employee understand the disclaimer. Petition for Writ of Cert. of Petitioner/Respondent at 10
& n.1.
24. Shelton,

__

S.C. at,
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evidence Louis Rich had any intent to defraud Shelton. "I The alleged
fraudulent act, the 1983 amendment, was too remote in time from Shelton's
1987 discharge and was "not a closely connected dishonest act sufficient to
support Shelton's claim."26

The court's final holding was its most significant. The court reversed the
trial court's grant of a directed verdict on Shelton's cause of action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.27 Judge Goolsby
remarked:
Under South Carolina law, there exists in every contract an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further, we find no authoritative
case law holding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
applicable to employment contracts that alter the employee's at-will status.
If, therefore, the jury finds the handbook issued to Shelton created an
employment contract that altered his at-will status, then the question of
whether Louis Rich breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing based on an employment contract is for the jury to decide. 28
This short paragraph at the end of the opinion has the potential effect of
vastly expanding employer liability by giving employees a new, broader cause
of action. Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not discuss the ramifications
particular to this cause of action in the employment context. South Carolina
recognizes such a cause of action in the insurance contract context as a tort.
Thus, the question arises, will this new action be one in tort or in contract? An
examination of how this state has dealt with the implied covenant doctrine
overall, and how other jurisdictions have dealt with it in the employment
context, may give the practitioner some insight on the final import of this
decision.
The South Carolina Supreme Court first recognized the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors,
Inc.2 9 Justice Brailsford stated "that noncontradictory terms may be implied
in a contract in order to effectuate the manifest intention of the parties when
the circumstances warrant it, and that there exists in every contract an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."30 The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Tharpe v. G.E. Moore Co." and Parker v. Byrd32 further endorsed

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at
, 459 S.E.2d at 857.
, 459 S.E.2d at 857.
Id. at
, 459 S.E.2d at 857.
Id. at
Id. at __, 459 S.E.2d at 857 (citation omitted).
247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
Id. at 366-67, 147 S.E.2d at 484.
254 S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397 (1970).
309 S.C. 189, 420 S.E.2d 850 (1992).
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the covenant in all contracts. The South Carolina version of the Uniform
Commercial Code contains the covenant,33 as does the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. 4 In the commercial context, the covenant serves as an additional term of the contract that can, without more, result in a breach of contract
action.35
Although the covenant had its genesis in commercial contracts, it is used
with greater effectiveness in insurance contracts.3 6 The seminal case of
Nichols v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3" changed the law

of insurance contracts in South Carolina. Relying on the California case of
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.3 8 the Nichols court held that "if an insured
can demonstrate bad faith or unreasonable action by the insurer in processing
a claim under their mutually binding insurance contract, he can recover
consequential damages in a tort action."" The court additionally held that if
the insured can show that the insurer acted willfully or "in 40reckless disregard
of the insured's rights, he can recover punitive damages.
Although the Nichols decision sounded in tort, subsequent decisions of the
court of appeals described the action as one in contract.4' In Brown v. South
CarolinaInsurance Co. Judge Bell analyzed why the cause of action sounded
in contract rather than in tort. He noted:
The principal theoretical objection to treating the Nichols cause of

action as sounding in contract is that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is nonconsensual, i.e., it does not result from a bargained

33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-203 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). For a discussion of when the
covenant applies to contracts generally, see Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980), and Robert S.
Summers, The GeneralDuty of GoodFaith-ItsRecognitionand Conceptualization,67 CORNELL
L. REV. 810 (1982).
35. See Hooton v. Carolina Treatment Ctr., 300 S.C. 37, 386 S.E.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1989);
Columbia East Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987).
36. See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 23 (1984) (noting that the
doctrine of good faith has been used most widely in the insurance context).
37. 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
38. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
39. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
40. Id.
41. See Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 S.C. 154, 348 S.E.2d 530 (Ct. App.
1986), appeal dismissed, 297 S.C. 73, 374 S.E.2d 897 (1989), overruledby Charleston County
School Dist. v. State Budget & Control Bd., 313 S.C.1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993); Brown v. South
Carolina Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 47, 324 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. grantedinpart,285 S.C.
456, 329 S.E.2d 768, and appeal dismissed, 290 S.C. 154, 348 S.E.2d 530 (1985), overruled
by Charleston County School Dist. v. State Budget & Control Bd., 313 S.C.1, 437 S.E.2d 6
(1993).
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agreement of the parties but is implied as a matter of law. This objection
loses much of its force in the context of insurance contracts. Few, if any,
terms in an insurance policy are bargained. . . . It is not anomalous,
therefore, to treat the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contact as an action in
contract rather than tort. . . . The true significance of Nichols is that it
expands the contractual remedy available to an insured who can prove bad
faith refusal to pay a valid claim under the contract.42
Charleston County School District v. State Budget & Control Board,43
however, overruled Brown and a similar holding, Bartlett v. Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,' to the extent that those cases held that the bad
faith insurance action is in contract, clearly stating that the action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on an insurance contract
is in tort.45 Therefore, Nichols did not create a new cause of action but
expanded the "Tyger River Doctrine" under which an insured can bring a bad
faith claim against an insurer for refusal to settle a claim within policy
limits.46 In summary, an insured's action against an insurer for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is in tort.
With few exceptions, the doctrine was not applied to employment
contracts in this state until Shelton.47 Moreover, some courts have expressly
rejected the doctrine in the employment at-will setting. 48 For example, in
Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Judge Hawldns stated that "the
concept of at-will employee/employer relations, with the attendant right to quit
or to fire at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all, is antithetical to
49
the concept of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

42. Brown, 284 S.C. at 55 n.4, 324 S.E.2d at 646-47 n.4.
43. 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993).
44. 290 S.C. at 154, 348 S.E.2d at 530.
45. 313 S.C. at 7-8, 437 S.E.2d at 9 ("In Nichols, we clearly held the cause of action was
a tort. To the extent Bartlett and Brown hold otherwise they are hereby overruled." (citation
omitted)).
46. Id. at 8, 437 S.E.2d at 10; see Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170
S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).

47. See Shivers v. John H. Harland Co., 310 S.C. 217, 423 S.E.2d 105 (1992) (employee
was wrongfully discharged for cause in violation of employment agreement with specified
duration); Martin v. Southern Ry., 224 S.C. 315, 136 S.E.2d 907 (1964) (applying bad faith
principles to collective bargaining agreement).
48. See Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985);
Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C.C.P.,
Dorchester County, Aug. 15, 1989) (relying on Satterfield).
49. Satterfield, 617 F. Supp. at 1363-64 (citations omitted). One commentator recently
conducted a survey of the various jurisdictions and how the covenant is applied in the
employment context. See Monique C. Lillard, Fiy Jurisdictionsin Search of a Standard: The
Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1233,

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/11
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The holding in Shelton is consistent with Satterfield. The consistency
stems from the distinction between employment-at-will and employment
contracts for a definite term. ° That is, Shelton guides South Carolina courts
to imply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing only in employment
contracts that alter an employee's at-will status." With this holding South
Carolina joins fifteen other jurisdictions that recognize the
implied covenant
2
of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts.
The major remaining question is whether the action will lie in tort or
contract. Shelton does not answer this question, and persuasive authority exists
on both sides.
However, most other jurisdictions conform to a contract
53
approach.
The most careful treatment of the issue is found in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., in which the California Supreme Court analyzed the reasons for
the tort exception for breach of the covenant in an insurance contract.54
1262 (1992). According to Professor Lillard's research, the following states have refused to
exercise the covenant in the employment context: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Professor Lillard had included South Carolina in this category. Id. at
1294.
50. See Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 486, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987)
(holding that there can be an implied employment contract altering the at-will status and creating
a distinction between the employment at-will and employment by contract).
51. See Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., _

S.C.

459 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Ct.

App. 1995).
52. Currently, only one other state, Nevada, recognizes the cause of action as a tort. See K
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (allowing breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing to give rise to tort liability in "rare and exceptional cases"), abrogatedon other
grounds by Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). The Montana Supreme
Court recognized the tort action in Gates v. Life ofMontana InsuranceCo., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont.
1983); however, the Montana Legislature subsequently passed the Wrongful Discharge From
Employment Act, creating a statutory action for discharge without cause and abolishing all
common law employment actions. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1996). See also
Steve R. Burford, Note, The Present Trend Toward a Good Faith Exception to the Employment
At-Will Doctrine, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 715, 722-25 & nn.70-74 (1989) (comparing the
jurisdictions that recognize the action as one in tort and one in contract.). The remaining
jurisdictions that recognize the covenant permit it as a contract action: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon,
and Tennessee. See Lillard, supra note 49, at 1262.
53. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 391-92 n.26 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
54. Id. at 390. Discussing some of the policies, the court noted that "Ithe insured in [an
insurance contract] does not seek to obtain a commercial advantage by purchasing the
policy-rather, he seeks protection against calamity."' Id. (quoting Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Cal. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980)). The court
went on to state that the insurance company's obligations are "quasi-public" in nature and that
the insured needs greater protection than contract remedy can provide. Id. "'[Tlhe relationship
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Relying on those policy reasons and on models from several commentators,
the court discussed whether it should apply the tort action to the employment
context. One model that the court discussed suggested extension of the tort of
bad faith to other contracts only if four characteristics of insurance bad-faith
actions are present:
(1) one of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior bargaining position
to the extent that it is able to dictate the terms of the contract; (2) the
purpose of the weaker party in entering into the contract is not primarily
to profit but rather to secure an essential service or product, financial
security or peace of mind; (3) the relationship of the parties is such that
the weaker party places its trust and confidence in the larger entity; and (4)
there is conduct on the part of the defendant indicating an intent to
55
frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the contract rights.
Using this test the Foley court held that employment contracts are not
sufficiently analogous to insurance contracts to warrant extension of the tort
of bad faith:
[W]e are not convinced that a "special relationship" analogous to that
between insurer and insured should be deemed to exist in the usual
employment relationship which would warrant recognition of a tort action
for breach of the implied covenant. . . . [A] breach in the employment
context does not place the employee in the same economic dilemma that
an insured faces when an insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim or to
accept a settlement offer within policy limits....
. . . [here is a fundamental difference between insurance and
employment relationships. In the insurance relationship, the insurer's and
the insured's interest are financially at odds ...
... [A]s a general rule it is to the employer's economic benefit to
retain good employees. The interests of employer and employee are most
frequently in alignment... . [Tihe special relationship model in the form
of judicially created relief of the kind sought here is less compelling. 6

of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced: the adhesive nature of insurance contracts places
the insurer in a superior bargaining position.'" Id. (quoting Egan, 620 P.2d at 146).
55. Id. at 394 (quoting Charles M. Louderback &Thomas W. Jurika, StandardsforLimiting
the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 227 (1982)).
56. Id. at 395-96. Justice Broussard, in a vigorous dissent, derided the majority for
disregarding existing California law that recognized the tort in the employment context. Id. at
403-04 (Broussard, J., dissenting). He went on to note that the California Court of Appeals
decisions distinguished by the majority were a strong foundation for recognizing the tort in the
employment context. Id. at 404. He further argued that changing existing law is better left to the
legislature than the court. Id. at 410-12.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/11
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South Carolina courts will face a similar problem in dealing with this
issue. As noted above, this state recognizes the tort of bad faith in the
insurance contract context.57 Yet most jurisdictions recognize the cause of
action in the employment setting as one in contract. 8 This is the better
course. One jurisdiction that originally recognized a cause of action for bad
faith has severely limited the action. 9 Another comment from the Foley court
stresses the importance of making the action one in contract:
An allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is an allegation of breach of an "ex contractu" obligation, namely
one arising out of the contract itself. The covenant of good faith is read
into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the
contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied
to the contract's purposes. The insurance cases thus were a major
departure from traditional principles of contract lawY°
Adopting the cause as one in contract will also fulfill the expectations of
the parties. If either an express or implied contract alters the employment-atwill relationship, then the parties have expectations arising out of this new
relationship. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing serves to protect
those expectations ("ex contractu"). The doctrine, in this context, is not
imposed on society as a whole but on the parties to the contract. 61 The
damages resulting from a breach would be typical expectation damages. If
there is an egregious breach of the covenant (typically by the employer), or if
there is evidence of fraud by the employer, then punitive damages as discussed
by Judge Bell in Brown would be an adequate remedy.62 This would be an
acceptable way to protect employees while still limiting the employer's liability
to the employment contract.
South Carolina is at a decisive point regarding the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment contract. Shelton clearly states

57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 391-92 n.26 (and cases cited therein); Burford, supra note 52,
at 725.
59. Compare Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (first court to
recognize a bad faith exception to the employment-at-will agreement), with Howard v. Dorr
Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (limiting Monge to cases in which employers' actions
contravene public policy).
60. Foley, 765 P.2d at 394.
61. Id. at 389.
62. "Our law has long recognized that a breach of contact with fraudulent intent and
accompanied by a fraudulent act will give rise to a claim for punitive damages in contract."
Brown v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 47, 56, 324 S.E.2d 641, 647 (Ct. App. 1984); see
also Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743 (1958) (ruling that
an action for breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act is ex contractu).
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that the covenant applies only when a contract alters the employment-at-will
status. 63 Certainty ends there. South Carolina should join the majority of
jurisdictions that permit the action as one in contract and not in tort. The tort
of bad faith should remain the extreme exception, not the rule, and should
apply only to breaches of the covenant in the insurance contract setting.
Anthony W. Livoti*

63. Shelton, __ S.C. at _, 459 S.E.2d at 857.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Dennis R. Nolan for his advice and comments on
earlier drafts.
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PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION OPEN TO POSSIBLE
EXPANSION IN EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL SITUATIONS

In Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp.' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
is not strictly limited to instances when an employer requires an employee to
violate a criminal law or when the termination of the employee is itself a
violation of the law. 2 As a result, it appears that South Carolina's formally
conservative approach to the public policy exception is now open to expansion.
The plaintiff, Cliff Garner, worked for four and one-half years as a pipefitter for M-K Ferguson, a subcontractor owned by defendant Morrison
Knudsen Corporation (Morrison Knudsen).3 Garner claimed that as he was
taking apart pipes he was sprayed with radioactive water.4 He allegedly
reported his concerns about unsafe working conditions and possible regulatory
violations to his supervisor. When he received an inadequate response, he
spoke to the press.' Eventually, Garner also testified before the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 6 and in his complaint he alleged that
Morrison Knudsen terminated his employment in retaliation for these
disclosures.7
Garner sued Morrison Knudsen for wrongful discharge based on the
public policy exception to employment at-will. The trial court granted the
employer's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' Garner argued on appeal that
the scope of the public policy exception "encompass[es] protection of
employees from retaliation by their employers for reporting nuclear safety
violations." 9 Because the supreme court did not specifically address the merits
of Garner's claim, it did not conclusively rule out application of the public
policy exception in this context. '0

1. - S.C. _, 456 S.E.2d 907 (1995).
2. Id. at
, 456 S.E.2d at 909.
3. Id. at __, 456 S.E.2d at 908.
4. Brief of Respondent at 4.
5. Id.
6. Garner, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 908.
7. Id.at
, 456 S.E.2d at 908.
8. Id. at
456 S.E.2d at 908.
9. Brief of Appellant at 4.
10. Indeed, the opinion circumvents any and all discussion of appellant's citations in support.
Appellant raised Wheelerv. CaterpillarTractorCo., 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (111. 1985), and Norris
v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1153 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying
Massachusetts law), to buttress his position that individuals raising concerns about the hazards
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South Carolina has recognized the employment-at-will doctrine since
1936." The doctrine unequivocally allows either party to terminate an at-will
relationship "at any time for any reason or no reason at all."" South
Carolina also recognizes two limited exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. 3 The first exception applies when an employee's at-will status is
altered by terms in an employee handbook. In such a situation, the termination
of the employee gives rise to a claim for breach of contract.' 4 The second
exception applies when the employee's discharge violates "a clear mandate of
public policy." 5 South Carolina courts historically have given narrow
construction to the public policy exception. 6 The resulting appearance is one
of wanting to separate ordinary disputes between employers and employees
from those that truly involve issues of public concern. A claimant's difficult
burden of proof evidences this state's pattern of strict construction. The public
policy exception requires that an employee prove that his discharge contravenes "a clear mandate of public policy." 7 Beyond this brief statement of
definition, the contextual public policy has been left largely without form. The
practitioner is left only with the general precept: Public policy concerns are
substantial and important or compelling, and they affect the people of the state
collectively.
The supreme court in Ludwick held that the exception is "invoked when
an employer requires an at-will employee, as a condition of retaining
employment, to violate the law." 8 Ms. Ludwick was a seamstress. She was
discharged after having refused her supervisors' instructions to disobey a
subpoena issued by the South Carolina Employment Security Commission.19
The supreme court found that Ms. Ludrick's retaliatory discharge violated

of nuclear material fall within the protection of the public policy exception. Brief of Appellant
at 11. Previously, when considering exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, the court has
looked at emerging law in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina,
Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 222, 337 S.E.2d 213, 214-15 (1985) (citing cases from other jurisdictions
that recognize the public policy exception).
11. See Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 89, 188 S.E. 499, 503 (1936).
12. Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 289, 278 S.E.2d 607,
609 (1981); accord Ludivick, 287 S.C. at 221, 337 S.E.2d at 214.
13. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C. 481, 484, 388 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id.; Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 223, 337 S.E.2d at 215.
16. See, e.g., Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc. 306 S.C. 496, 498, 413 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1992);
Epps v. Clarendon County, 304 S.C. 424, 426, 405 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1991). In both Dockins
and Epps the court deferred to existing statutory remedies rather than expand the public policy
exception.
17. Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 223, 337 S.E.2d at 215.
18. Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
19. Id.at 220-21, 337 S.E.2d at 213-14.
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public policy.20 Because South Carolina law required the employee to
respond to the subpoena, it would be contrary to the state's interest to allow
an employer to force the employee to choose between retaining her employment or exposing herself to criminal liability. 2'
In adopting the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine, the supreme court was cautious.22 The court acknowledged the
"peril that an outpouring of vexatious and frivolous litigation [might] be
spawned by modification of the [employment-at-will] doctrine."' The
employee's chance of success improves considerably if the discharge violated
a well-established state policy as articulated in a statute, legislative pronouncement, or administrative nile.24 However, if a statute creates its own substantive rights and provides remedies for infringement of those rights, the
employee is limited to the statutory remedy.25
Statutory protection of certain employees, such as through the popularly
named Whistleblower Act,26 has given South Carolina courts further justification for moving cautiously in broadening judicial recognition of abusive
discharge. One South Carolina court has stated: "To permit [the employee] to
pursue his own remedy at common law would be both redundant and an
inappropriate intrusion into the legislative prerogative ... ."27 By dint of
argument and ten years of decisions articulating what is not public policy, the
supreme court in Garner corrected the restrictive interpretation of its past
holdings.
The state courts of South Carolina have been more precise in ruling what
is not public policy than in giving meaning to the definition in Ludwick. For
example, in Miller v. Fairfield Conununities, Inc. ,28 the plaintiff alleged that
20. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
21. Id. The Ludwick court relied primarily upon decisions from other jurisdictions that had
also held that it is against a state's public policy to allow employers to fire employees who refuse
to obey directions to violate the criminal law. Id. at 222, 337 S.E.2d at 214-15. See e.g.
Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (denying
employer the right to fire employee for refusing employer's demand to commit perjury); Sides
v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).

22. Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
23. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
24. See e.g., Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 309 S.C. 243, 246, 422 S.E.2d 91, 92-93
(1992) (recognizing thata clear mandate ofpublic policy incorporates state statute defining crimes
that violate public policy).
25. E.g., Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc. 306 S.C. 496, 498, 413 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1992).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (providing remedy to an
employee of a public body who is retaliated against for reporting or testifying about wrongdoing
by the public body).
27. Plaumann v. Action Container Corp., No. 94-CP-40-3616, 1995 WL 722863, at *4
(S.C.C.P. Aug. 15, 1995) (at will employee alleged wrongful discharge after his refusal to violate
O.S.H.A. and environmental regulations).
28. 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. dismissed, 302 S.C. 518, 397 S.E.2d
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his employer demanded that plaintiffs wife, a real estate agent for a competitor of the employer, leave her job.29 If she refused, the plaintiff would have
to resign his employment. Plaintiff resigned and sued the employer for
wrongful discharge and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act." The
court of appeals held that the scope of the public policy exception was limited
only to those situations in which "an employer requires an at-will employee
to violate the law as a condition of retaining his employment." 3 The court
in Miller further commented that by limiting the claim for abusive discharge
"to situations involving the actual refusal to engage in illegal activity, or the
intention to fulfill a statutorily prescribed duty," such claims could be tied
down to "a manageable and clear standard."32
The next treatment of the public policy doctrine by the South Carolina
Supreme Court also illustrated a determination to focus more on what is not
covered by the exception. In Epps v. Clarendon County 3 an employee of the
Clarendon County Department of Public Works alleged that his termination
violated an implied employment contract created by an employee handbook. 34
He also claimed that his political association with the former director of the
Department prompted his discharge. 35 The court declined to extend the public
policy exception, concluding that Mr. Epps had "an existing remedy for a
discharge which allegedly violates rights other than the right to the employment itself. "36
The court's decision in Dockins v. Ingles Markets37 was in lock step with
Epps. In Dockins the employee claimed his wrongful discharge was in
retaliation for filing a complaint against his employer for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 38 The court reiterated that the "public policy exception
to the termination of at-will employees has not been extended beyond situations where the termination is in retaliation for an employee's refusal to violate
the law at the direction of his employer. " 31 Concluding that the federal act
377 (1990).
29. Id. at 24-25, 382 S.E.2d at 17-18.
30. Id. at 25, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
31. Id. at 26, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
32. Id. at 27, 382 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303,
1307 (4th Cir. 1987)). The reasoning in Adler was followed by the lower court in Garner as
precedent for judicial limitation of application of the public policy exception. Record at 16.
33. 304 S.C. 424, 405 S.E.2d 386 (1991) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 425, 405 S.E.2d at 386.
35. Id. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387.
36. Id. Mr. Epps also claimed that his constitutional rights of free speech and association had
been infringed. As the court noted, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provided Mr. Epps with a civil
cause of action. Id.
37. 306 S.C. 496, 413 S.E.2d 18 (1992).
38. Id. at 497, 413 S.E.2d at 18.
39. Id.
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precluded the employee's state tort claim, the court held that "[w]hen a statute
creates a substantive right and provides a remedy for infringement of that
right, the plaintiff is limited to that statutory remedy."40
The first case to evidence any tendency towards expansion, Culler v. Blue
Ridge Electric Cooperative,4 laid ambiguity on the evolution of the public
policy exception. The employee in Culler claimed that he was terminated for
his refusal to contribute money to a political action fund.42 Although the
court upheld the finding that Culler had not been fired for such a reason, it
noted that a state statute made it a crime to discharge employees for their
political beliefs and that an employee so discharged would have a cause of
action under the public policy exception.43 The court also stated that the court
of appeals' earlier interpretation in Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc.' of
the public policy exception was too limited and that Ludwick "extends to
'violation of a clear mandate of public policy.'"4

This rejection of the restricted and mechanical application of the exception
was underscored in Garner. The lower court in Garner erred in finding that
because the plaintiff's complaint neither alleged that his employer compelled
him to choose between violating South Carolina's criminal laws or being fired
nor alleged the existence of a South Carolina law that made the employee's
discharge illegal, Garner had not stated a claim under the public policy
exception." On appeal, Garner argued two theories supporting coverage of
his claim under the clear-mandate-of-public-policy standard. First, he argued
that concerns about possible radioactive contamination of the environment
constitute a compelling public policy.47 Second, he contended that an employee should be free from employer retaliation when the employee provides testimony to government agencies about nuclear safety issues.4"
Because the clear-mandate-of-public-policy standard is a judicially
recognized exception, there is no requirement that the state legislature must
have enacted a statute creating a right to sue. However, plaintiffs asserting a
claim of wrongful discharge often look to statutes to find expressions of public
policy. Garner argued that his concerns about possible violations at the

40. Id. at 498, 413 S.E.2d at 19.
41. 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (1992).
42. Id. at 245, 422 S.E.2d at 92.
43. Id. at 246, 422 S.E.2d at 93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995) (making it a misdemeanor to fire someone for their political views). The section is one of
several listed "Crimes Against Public Policy" defined by the statute.
44. 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989).
45. Id. at 246, 422 S.E.2d at 92. The court, however, refused to comment further on the
ultimate result in Miller. Id. at 246 n.1, 422 S.E.2d at 92 n.l.
46. Garner, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 909.
47. Reply Brief of Appellant at 1-2.
48. Id. at 2.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Savannah River Site were precisely the hazards that the South Carolina
General Assembly had declared to be of importance to the public safety."
The supreme court would not have been alone had it chosen to address
explicitly whether public policy is violated when an employer discharges an
employee who reports regulatory violations in the nuclear industry. Courts in
other jurisdictions have held that an employee may not be terminated for
reporting safety problems at a nuclear power plant when the employee was
statutorily required to do so" or when the employee reports a good faith
belief that records concerning the construction of nuclear facilities are being
falsified or maintained in violation of federal regulations."'
Garner's second theory, regarding discharge in retaliation for testifying
before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, is analogous to pleading
under a whistleblower statute. Numerous cases establish that a state's public
policy favors employees coming forward and aiding the judicial and administrative processes. 2
The supreme court in Garner wisely avoided discussing what was
essentially a factual dispute between the parties concerning questions of federal
pre-emption and exhaustion of existing mechanisms for addressing employee
complaints. The court simply examined its earlier holdings and concluded that
it had never prescribed the limits of what constitutes a clear mandate of public
policy. The opinion is unclear as to which of the two theories presented by
Garner the court found more compelling. The "novel issue"53 will for the
time being remain open. The parties reached a settlement after the decision,
and Department of Energy amendments may have precluded the appearance
of similar causes of action. 4
C.F.W. Manning, II

49. Id. at 4. The Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-10 to 1020 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995), is a statutory scheme that regulates the safe use and
handling of nuclear materials.
50. See Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
51. See Howard v. Zack Co., 637 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
52. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (allowing a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when an employee was terminated in retaliation for supporting a co-worker's
sexual harassment claim); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass.
1991) (employee wrongfully discharged in retaliation for cooperating with Customs officials'
investigation of employer).
53. Garner, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 909.
54. See Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(2)(D) (1995) (allowing for the
inclusion of D.O.E. contractor employees within anti-retaliation provisions). But see English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 86 (1990) (stating that tort actions were not meant to be preempted by the federal nuclear whistleblower act).
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